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DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY. By Kenneth 
Culp Davis. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1969. 
Pp. 233. $8.50. 
Professor Davis, a distinguished professor of law at the Univer-
sity of Chicago and author of the scholarly four-volume Adminis-
trative Law Treatise,1 delivered the Edward Douglass White Lectures 
I. 1955. 
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at Louisiana State University in 1966. Those lectures have now 
been rewritten and published as an essay entitled Discretionary 
Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry. The work's central inquiry is, in 
the author's words "what can be done to minimize injustice from 
exercise of discretionary power" (p. 3). His answer is 
that we should eliminate much unnecessary discretionary power and 
that we should do much more than we have been doing to confine, 
to structure, and to check necessary discretionary power. The goal 
is not the maximum degree of confining, structuring, and checking; 
the goal is to find the optimum degree for each power in each set of 
circumstances. [Pp. 3-4.] 
The primary concern of the author is with discretionary justice 
for individual parties, particularly in the administrative process. 
He deliberately excludes, therefore, situations in which discre-
tionary justice is applied to other than individual parties, such as 
when discretionary justice is present in the making of decisions or 
policies which affect particular social groups or segments of the 
population. One may wonder whether the grounds for those exclu-
sions are convincing. Is it of no relevance to the argument that a 
substantial proportion of today's youth believes that policy deci-
sions concerning our military and foreign policy in Vietnam or 
concerning legal aid to the poor are pertinent in considering justice 
for individual parties? Is it not the case that often the major basis 
for concluding that injustice has been done to individual parties 
is a showing that the social groups to which they belong are sys-
tematically excluded? 
Professor Davis offers no rationale for selecting and treating 
particular problems of discretionary justice in some agencies and 
not in others. My guess is that Professor Davis' concerns arise more 
from his values and experience as a legal expert in administrative 
law than they do from systematic attention to theoretical or em-
pirical concerns about discretionary justice to individual parties. 
He has the expert's eye for discretionary justice in the United States 
Immigration Service, the Federal Trade Commission, and regula-
tory agencies in the public sector; and he displays the liberal's con-
cern for injustice in selective enforcement and in the administration 
of privileges and gratuities. Moreover, he shares contemporary 
alarm over the discretion exercised by police and prosecutors. His 
omissions, however, scant important problems that must be dealt 
with in any theory concerning discretionary justice. Brief mention 
of a few may call attention to such theoretical problems. 
Nowhere, for example, does Professor Davis discuss the admin-
istrative procedures of the military forces or of the selective service 
system, even though the former is particularly notorious for exces-
sive rule making and for the arbitrary application of rules. Indeed, 
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the problem of Catch 22-exercising choice among alternatives and 
creating new rules for decisions-is inadequately treated in the 
book. Yet, in my opinion that problem is the central one in discre-
tionary decision making. 
Furthermore, nowhere does the book treat discretionary justice 
in civil rights agencies despite the existence of some rather impor-
tant investigations on the subject.2 Those investigations make it 
clear that demonstrating injustice to an individual party is often 
out of the question when discrimination occurs against the minor-
ity group to which that party belongs. Often it is far easier to show 
that an employer is discriminating on a particular basis than it is 
to demonstrate the specific ways in which the discrimination is 
being carried out. Indeed, if one is concerned with discretionary 
decisions about "failure to act," often the only way of demonstrating 
such failure is to resort to behavioral-science research on populations 
which are not part of an agency's caseload. The study of civil rights 
organizations also demonstrates how important public policy may be 
in the way those organizations exercise discretionary justice. Problems 
of selective enforcement in administration are just as glaring among 
civil rights agencies as they are among the police. There is little 
theoretical difference between a civil rights agency exercising discre-
tion in setting a policy to ignore discrimination in housing, univer-
sities, or hospitals in order to focus on discrimination in employment, 
and a police department establishing a policy to ignore gambling but 
not homicide. 
Finally, nowhere does Professor Davis discuss the special prob-
lems of exercising discretionary justice in situations in which pro-
fessionals are involved as administrators, except when he treads 
lightly on the discretionary powers of judges in sentencing and 
somewhat more heavily on that of prosecutors. I find this omission 
not at all surprising, not, as might be suspected, because one goes 
lightly on matters involving one's own profession, but because the 
core element defining any profession is the exercise of discretionary . 
judgment-a judgment that ordinarily is subject to review only by 
one's peers.3 One of the basic problems in discretionary decision 
making, then, is the relationship between a professional decision 
and an administrative decision. For example, doctors in hospitals, 
professors and deans in law schools and universities, and public-
school teachers make many professional-administrative decisions; 
and those decisions may be of greater consequence to individuals 
than are many of the ones about which Professor Davis gets so · ex-
cited. Thus a physical blow by the police might have less long-run 
2. See, e.g., L MAYHEW, LAW AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (1968). 
3. See Reiss, Professionalization of the Police, in POUCE AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS 
215-ll0 (A. Brandstatter 8: L. Radelet ed. 1968). 
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effect on an adolescent than would the bad judgment of a teacher 
whom the child confronts every day. . 
The relationship between a professional decision and an adminis-
trative one is not simple. Bureaucracies are built on rules and on the 
notion that decisions must be made according to those rules and with 
relatively little choice in applying them. Professional decision mak-
ing is based on quite the opposite model-the necessity to exercise 
judgment when confronted with the individual case. That difference 
may explain why professionals are so easily alienated by bureaucracies 
and find it difficult to work in them. There is perhaps another reason 
why we do not like to regard both of these types of organizations as 
having the same kind of problem: to do so tests the generality of our 
model. But should the informal procedures in our law schools-
selective admission, training, grading, and appeal-be regarded any 
differently from those of a state employment service or a state mental 
hospital? While Professor Davis might reply as he does at the begin-
ning of his book-"[t]he goal is not the maximum degree of con-
fining, structuring, and checking; the goal is to find the optimum 
degree for each power in each set of circumstances" (p. 4)-nowhere 
does he tell us how one may determine "the optimum degree for each 
power in each set of circumstances" and to whom it should apply. Yet, 
above all, that determination is central to his or any theory of social 
control. 
Quite clearly, the author is most comfortable in the bureaucratic 
or administered society, if by that term we mean a society in which 
as much decision making as possible is accomplished by making and 
applying rules. Officials rather than legislators make rules, and officials 
rather than judges apply them. Like many sociologists who regard 
bureaucracy as a great social invention, Professor Davis believes that 
"[t]he procedure of administrative rule-making is ... one of the 
greatest inventions of modern government" (p. 65). The Adminis-
trative Procedure Act4 is the model of procedure in rule making, and 
he writes of it in very positive terms: "The procedure is both fair 
and efficient. Much experience proves that it usually works beau-
tifully" (p. 65). Insight into his approach may be seen from his model 
of a body of rules: 
The most precise and detailed set of administrative rules I know 
of is the Federal Tax Regulations which fill more than four thou-
sand double-column pages of rather fine print. These rules are the 
product of the effort of thousands of federal employees over many 
decades, and the whole set of regulations seems to me an especially 
admirable body of law, even though the process of correcting imper-
fections seems endless. [P. 43.] 
4. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
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Experience is hardly a substitute for research, however, and it seems 
doubtful that the host of studies on bureaucratic rule and decision 
making supports such testimony.I• 
It seems that Professor Davis' ideal is to have a rule for every 
decision, although, practical man that he is, he withdraws from what 
he regards as "excessive detail" in rule making, since "reasonable 
human beings who are expected to apply the rules will inevitably 
rebel against excessive detail" (p. 43). Despite his apparent awareness 
that an increase in the amount of administrative detail results in a 
corresponding increase in administrative discretion, nowhere does he 
treat this relationship as a problem or obstacle. The behavioral-
science literature on choice in decision making strongly suggests 
that an increase in the choices available reduces the capacity to dis-
criminate among them, thereby substantially reducing the probability 
that the most rational choice will be made. 6 
Perhaps the reason why Professor Davis is so comfortable with 
rule making is that he firmly believes the principle which he claims 
that Judge Henry Friendly does not understand: "An adjudicatory 
opinion can never say anything that cannot be said as well or better in 
a rule" (p. 46). The reason underlying this maxim is that "a rule 
need not contain any generalization" (p. 60). The practice is simple 
enough: when faced with a decision, find a rule; when a rule cannot 
be found, turn to Catch-22 and "announce a decision as a rule." But 
just how the rule reduces arbitrariness in decision making is no 
clearer than Catch-22. 
'1>rofessor Davis advances many specific proposals for structuring 
and confining the discretion exercised by administrative officials in 
a variety of agencies. Those proposals seem eminently reasonable. 
Why shouldn't an applicant for a visa, for a bank charter, or for 
admission to a public university be given reasons or an opportunity 
for rebuttal when his application is denied? Why shouldn't plea bar-
gaining be denied to public prosecutors, or at least why shouldn't 
they be required to announce the rules that govern their choices? 
Why shouldn't the sentencing power of judges be restricted so as to 
reduce the disparity of sentences among judges? And finally, 
why shouldn't the selective enforcement practices of officials be con-
fined by rules? 
What Professor Davis does in his book, then, is to raise questions 
such as these about practices in governmental agencies and to point 
to the kinds of injustice that can arise because discretion is exercised. 
5. Feldman 8: Kanter, Organizational Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZA-
noNs 614-49 CT· March ed. 1965). 
6. See Edwards, Decision Making, in 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL 
ScmNCES 34-41 (1968); Newell 8: Simon, Simulation: Individual Behavior, in 14 INTER-
NATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 262-68 (1968). 
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But nowhere does he provide evidence of "injustice" occurring 
because discretion is not structured, confined, or checked in the 
manner he would have it, and nowhere does he provide evidence that 
following his guidelines would necessarily result in "justice." Rarely 
does he document the effect of any change; consequently, the book 
lacks, in the language of behavioral scientists, any evidence drawn 
from "before-after" studies of the effect of changing the structure of 
decision making in organizations.7 One wonders whether the changes 
are to be thought of as inherently good even though they may not 
achieve the objectives. 
Throughout his essay, Professor Davis relies on rule making as 
the principal means for confining discretion, on openness of discre-
tionary processes as the major means for structuring discretion, and 
on supervision and review as the major means for checking discre-
tion. These are, of course, the classic means and processes operating 
in modern bureaucracies. What is absent from Professor Davis' treat-
ment, however-a deficiency that may puzzle behavioral scientists-
is both a consideration of the relative importance of these factors 
and a consideration of how bureaucracies can turn these means to 
ends of justice or can find ways to circumvent them so that decisions 
go against the interests of individual parties. 
Were I to speculate on the relative importance of the three factors 
in protecting individual parties, it would seem to me that openness 
is the most important; yet it may be most easily subverted. The open-
ness of the courtroom, for instance, is easily subverted by proceedings 
in chambers, conferences, and so on; and the ope~ness of hearings 
in agencies may easily be subverted by fictions that place private ends 
above public ones. This question of the relative importance of open-
ness to the other factors is, of course, an empirical question that 
should be investigated; but a consideration of the theory of, and 
research on, bureaucracies should aid one in predicting effects of 
change. 
Professor Davis' concern with making rules to protect individual 
parties provides an example of his failure to consider such empirical 
questions. Since he is almost altogether concerned with how the 
absence of rules gives rise to injustice, he fails to examine how their 
presence may create grounds for it. Does not the very existence of 
rules as well as their absence give rise to discretion that may be 
arbitrary and unjust? It is not enough for Professor Davis to resolve 
tJ.uestions of fact by opinion, as he often does. At the very outset, for 
instance, he announces: 
7. Leavitt, Applied Organizational Change in Industry: Structural, Technological 
and Humanistic Approaches, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONS 1144-70 (J. March ed. 
1965). 
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I believe that officers and judges do reasonably well at the rules end 
of the scale because rules make for evenhandedness, because creation 
of rules makes it relatively unemotional, and because decision-mak-
ers seldom err in the direction of excessive rigidity when individual-
ization is needed. And probably injustice is almost as infrequent 
toward the middle of the scale where principles or other guides keep 
discretion limited or controlled. I think the greatest and most infre-
quent injustice occurs at the discretion end of the scale, where rules 
and principles provide little or no guidance, where emotions of de-
ciding officers may affect what they do, where political or other fa-
voritism may influence decisions, and where the imperfections of hu-
man nature are often reflected in the choices made. [P. v.] 
Perhaps so, but these are empirical questions which call for a con-
sideration of the theory and research relating to bureaucracies. 
Indeed, examination of the structure and nature of bureaucracies 
seems crucial for determining the quality of administrative justice. 
While it is a cardinal principle in the Weberian theory of bureau-
cracy that rules are a way of ensuring consistent treatment of all indi-
vidual parties,8 it also is a principle that bureaucracies neutralize 
civic power.0 Paradoxically, then, protection exists only so long as 
bureaucratic officials behave properly. When they do not, the capacity 
for citizens to affect official actions is very limited. How can one 
ignore the fact that the history of regulatory commissions is a history 
of their co-optation, that the power to litigate is the power to neu-
tralize much administration, and that for every formal procedure 
there is an informal one of circumvention. Above all, there is Catch-
22. 
A major concern of Professor Davis is with injustice arising from 
selective enforcement. He comments that"the power to be lenient is 
the power to discriminate" (p. 170), and he opposes selective enforce-
ment. But modern administrative bureaucracies invariably allocate 
scarce enforcement resources under a policy of selective enforcement. 
Even his much-admired Internal Revenue Service engages in such 
enforcement when auditing tax returns. To be sure, the IRS follows 
computerized stochastic, or random, processes in doing so; but is 
random selection, based on computerization, what defines justice 
in selective enforcement? Perhaps so for Professor Davis, since he 
advises: 
Take for instance the Social Security Administration in its adjudica-
tion of claims. The answers are highly crystallized for old age and 
survivors claims, and computers do most of the work; the tiny pro-
s. See MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETI.' (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954); 
M. WEBER, Bureaucracy, in FROM MAX WEBER: EssAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196-244 (H. Gerth 
8c C.W. Mills ed. 1946). 
9. Weber, Bureaucracy, supra note 8, at 230-32. 
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portion of disputed claims are disposed of with great efficiency; sig-
nificant policy questions still arise and probably always will, but they 
are highly exceptional! [Pp. 7-8.] 
Indeed, the stipulateq. advantages of an administrative bureaucracy, 
with its high degree of rationality, application of rules through com-
puterized justice, and informal accountability through communica-
tion, are all apparent in Professor Davis' prescription for enforce-
ment and adjudication. 
The problem of avoiding injustice to individual parties when 
discretion is exercised is a problem in constructing fail-safe organiza-
tions and systems. As yet, we do not know very well how to go about 
such construction. But many of the questions posed by Professor 
Davis, and his answers to those questions, are amenable to scientific 
investigation. Two examples make this fact apparent. Professor Davis 
asserts: "For problem cases, group decisions made possible through 
subdelegation are clearly preferable to decisions by board members 
without group delegation" (p. 132). Similarly, he states: "A jury of 
twelve is better than a jury of one because the twelve check each 
other's weaknesses, emotions, and idiosyncracies; a nine-judge court 
or a three-judge court is better than a one-judge court for the same 
reason" (p. 143). So far as I know, neither the literature on small-
group studies nor that on natural experiments confirms either of 
these propositions,10 although they are hardly testable in the form 
stated. Legal scholars and behavioral scientists might profitably 
pursue such questions together. 
Albert ]. Reiss, Jr., 
Professor of Sociology and 
Lecturer, The Law School, 
University of Michigan 
INDIAN ECONOMIC PouCY. By B. R. Shenoy. Bombay: Popular 
Prakashan. 1968. Pp. xviii, 354. Rs. 25. 
Seventy per cent of the investment resources of India are allo-
cated to the public sector. The dominating patticipation of the gov-
ernment in India's mixed economy underscores the necessity for 
economists to exercise a constant and critical vigil on Indian eco-
nomic policy. Professor Shenoy's book, therefore, deserves a hearty 
welcome. However, contrary to the expectations engendered by the 
10. See s. SIEGEL & L. FOURAKER, BARGAINING AND GROUP DECISION MAKING (1960). 
See also The Group as a System of Social Interaction (pt. III), in SMALL GROUPS 845-
574 (P. Hare, E. Borgatta & R. Bales ed. 1955). 
March 1970] Recent Books 797 
title of the book, it is not a comprehensive treatment in coordinated 
chapters of the Indian government's general economic policy. In-
stead, it is a collection of Professor Shenoy's articles, published from 
1958 to 1966 in daily newspapers as well as in professional journals, 
in criticism of the government's policies. Consequently, the chapters 
are at times annoyingly repetitive and often relate to particular 
policy decisions made by the government on various occasions. How-
ever, a theme does emerge from the book as a whole, and it is some-
times supported by excellent analysis. That theme is that the 
centralized economic planning and the diversion of resources to the 
public sector have resulted in serious economic and social ills in 
India. 
Professor Shenoy observes that the Indian national income is 
among the lowest as well as slowest rising in the world. Although 
nearly one half of it is drawn from agriculture, and although nearly 
seventy per cent of the population lives on that one half, agriculture 
has remained neglected. This neglect is evident from the poor allo-
cation of resources to agriculture, while growing proportions of 
domestic savings and foreign aid are appropriated to the public sec-
tor and to the heavy industries in the private sector. The growth 
of national income (3.2 per cent per annum) has barely kept pace 
with the growth of population (2.2 per cent per annum); and after 
these statistics are adjusted to real terms, the actual well-being of 
the masses appears to have declined. Inflation has been on the in-
crease as a result of the combination of the budget deficits covered 
by Reserve Bank and commercial bank borrowing, the secondary 
expansion of credit due to deficit financing by commercial banks on 
their reserves, and the rupee payments made to the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) in New Delhi for 
the imports of food grains and other agricultural surpluses from the 
United States under its Public Law (P.L.) 83-480.1 Although the 
P .L. imports have discharged the humanitarian function of making 
up for crop failures, they have, in Professor Shenoy's opinion, dis-
torted the price structure and induced shortfalls in production, and 
consequently have created the need for food imports. These imports 
squeeze the food grain farmer and induce him to shift land and 
resources away from food crops. Since the shift is artificial, the na-
tional product is adversely affected. The need for such imports is 
likely to continue so long as the policies of forced industrialization 
continue to the neglect of agriculture. The rise in food grain prices 
is the result of physical shortages of food grains and inflation, not 
of any monopoly combination or hoarding on the part of traders 
and large farmers. Therefore, according to Professor Shenoy, anti-
I. Agriculture Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 454, codified 
in 7 U.S.C. §§ 1427, 1431, 1691-94, 1701·09, 1721-24 (1964). 
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hoarding ordinances would merely shift the hoarding from a com-
paratively small number of traders and large farmers to house-
holders. Moreover, Professor Shenoy feels, long-range help cannot 
be expected from the Food Corporation, a public-sector corporation 
designed to ensure a minimum price to the producer and to protect 
the consumer from speculative trade. The Corporation, in its effort 
to meet its high running costs and to show profits, would squeeze 
both farmers and consumers and would open up fresh portfolios 
of political partonage and power. The price controls have failed not 
because there has been collusion between traders and cultivators, 
but because the government has failed to deal properly with the two 
major causes of rising prices, mentioned above. In addition, in 
Professor Shenoy's view, food rationing in urban areas would not 
help the food crisis, since support for rationing depends on the mis-
taken theory that hoarding is the cause of the crisis. Indeed, ration-
ing may be worse than no rationing at all, since, on account of the 
black market, it does not reduce consumption, and since, at the same 
time, it works against the poor by raising the black-market prices. 
Professor Shenoy believes that dependence on food imports is both 
unnecessary and uneconomic, because the food deficit, being only 
6.6 per cent of the net domestic production, is marginal in relation 
to domestic production, and because it is possible to achieve sub-
stantial increase in food production at costs much lower than the 
costs of United States food grains. However, farmers are unable to 
increase production since the bulk of investment resources from 
domestic savings and foreign aid is appropriated to the public sector, 
instead of meeting the capital needs of the farmer, and since the 
existing laws narrowly circumscribe the activities of private bankers 
and moneylenders in attending to the needs of the farmer. 
According to Professor Shenoy, the state domination of invest-
ment activity is the cause of social injustice, because it concentrates 
economic power in the hands of the politicians and civil servants 
with the result that those state functionaries gain arbitrary rights 
of disposal over the employment, livelihood, and welfare of "vir-
tually the entire nation" (p. 38). Moreover, forced industrialization 
has retarded the growth of the national product by diverting the 
resources away from agriculture and the consumer goods industries, 
in which the yields and employment potential are the highest, to 
the production of capital goods and intermediate products, in which 
the yields and employment potential are generally the lowest. Ap-
propriation of seventy per cent of the investment resources to the 
public sector has created excess production capacities in public sec-
tor undertakings, has led to wastes through corruption and in-
efficiency, and has resulted in the capital starvation of agriculture. 
The overemphasis on industry has, in certain favored areas, pushed 
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industrial production beyond its economic limit and has prevented 
agricultural production from reaching its proper economic limit. 
Professor Shenoy believes that exchange controls and import restric-
tions do not add to the available supply of investment resources, 
but that, instead, they retard the pace of development, fail to alle-
viate the adverse balance of payments, and in fact accentuate income 
contrasts by shifting enormous incomes to the beneficiaries of import 
licenses. He does not accept the official explanation that the phase 
of price rise which began in 1955 is the natural consequence of 
economic development, and he finds the cause of that rise to be in 
the government's attempts to invest nonexistent resources through 
the device of budget deficits which result in the expansion of money. 
The current inflation, he believes, does not result from indiscrimi-
nate use of bank funds, and thus the policy of a credit curb against 
banks is a punishment which they do not deserve. It may be noted 
here that the larger banks in India have been nationalized since 
Professor Shenoy's writings. 
Professor Shenoy advocates drastic cuts in revenue collections by 
the state in order to step up national savings and avert the human 
cruelty involved in cuts in the consumption standards of the masses 
who are already at the margin of subsistence. He regards progressive 
taxation as particularly pernicious and deserving of abolition, since 
[i]ts incidence is anti-social in that it virtually closes the route to 
vertical mobility in the acquisition of income and wealth; tends to 
freeze the prevailing pattern of income and wealth distribution; de-
prives the community of the full production advantages of its ablest 
men as it penalizes talent and efficiency; and thus debilitates a major 
force of dynamism and growth. [P. 177.] 
He thinks that "[m]odern communities have been saved from the 
full impact of progressive taxation through tax avoidance and 
illegal tax evasion, though the moral and economic costs of this have 
been heavy" (p. 177). 
The foreign exchange reserves of India have suffered a "swing 
..• from abundance to penury" (p. 181). The official explanation 
for the swing cites defense expenditures, economic development, 
the food crisis, high imports, and adverse movements in interna-
tional prices. Professor Shenoy refuses to accept that apology; in-
stead, he sees foreign exchange difficulties as a functional counterpart 
of inflation. Inflation has ·overvalued the rupee; and overvaluation 
of the rupee has handicapped export production and has necessi-
tated exchange control and import restrictions which, in turn, with 
the help of other general economic policies, have resulted in in-
discriminate import substitution, that is, a shift away from export 
production in order to fill the domestic need created by import 
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restrictions. Despite receipts of foreign aid, the balance-of-payments 
difficulties have persisted because of the increase in the imports of 
raw materials and capital equipment due to the expansion of the 
national product, and because of the inability of the economy to 
produce sufficient export earnings to pay for the increase in essential 
imports. The overvaluation of the rupee has thus resulted in (1) a 
heavy decline in currency reserves, (2) a rise in external prices of 
Indian exports, (3) an undue cheapening of import goods in relation 
to the corresponding home products, (4) gaps benveen the landed 
costs of import goods and their market prices, and (5) a gap between 
the internal and external prices of gold which has resulted in illicit 
imports of gold. 
Foreign aid, in Professor Shenoy's opinion, has not been able to 
achieve its objective of bringing to the masses a relief from poverty 
and from unemployment. Rather, much of the aid has been mis-
directed. That misdirection has not been a deliberate act, but a 
fortuitous outcome of centralized economic planning, extensive con-
trols, phenomenal illicit incomes produced by the controls, undue 
extension of the public sector to the point that it absorbs seventy 
per cent of the available investment resources, inflation resulting 
from attempts to invest nonexistent resources, and overvaluation of 
the rupee resulting from the past inflation. 
In addition to giving his criticisms of the Indian government's 
economic policies, Professor Shenoy offers his own solutions to the 
problems he examines. He suggests, for example, that in order to 
meet the balance-of-payments difficulties, there be a complete stop 
to overinvestment and a devaluation of the rupee to the equilibrium 
level.2 His remedy to the food crisis calls for a stop on inflation and, 
at the same time, sufficient imports of food grains to cover the food 
shortages. But he sees no lasting solution to the food problem unless 
first, the colossal public sector appropriations of investment funds 
are drastically scaled down to permit a larger flow of these funds 
into agriculture; and, secondly, legislation now crippling the busi-
ness of agricultural credit by obstructing the flow of credit and 
capital into farm finance and by imparting [sic] the credit-worthiness 
of farmers is suitably amended. [P. 33.] 
He feels that the removal of exchange controls and import restric-
tions is a necessary prerequisite to accelerated economic and social 
progress. His solution to inflation requires drastic cuts in the al-
location of resources to the public sector in order to stop invest-
ment of nonexistent resources. His cure for the foreign exchange 
difficulties is to stop inflation and to adjust the value of the rupee 
2. The rupee has in fact been devalued since Professor Shenoy's writings, and he 
makes a note of that fact in the preface to his book. 
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to equilibrium level, preferably through the device of a floating 
rupee. He suggests these same measures-that is, prevention of 
further inflation and devaluation of the rupee-as remedies for 
illicit imports of gold. Professor Shenoy recommends four reforms 
to meet the problem of overvaluation of the rupee: (I) a policy of 
zero inflation; (2) a shift back from production for the home market 
to production for exports; (3) a downward adjustment in the ex-
change value of the rupee; and (4) elimination of price gaps between 
the landed costs and the market prices of import goods, and between 
the official and the market prices of gold. All in all, he wants to 
"scale down drastically nationalization through the extension of 
the public sector, governmental interventionalism in the life of the 
community, and to rely on [sic] a much larger measure than now on 
the market mechanism for the allocation of resources" (p. 189). 
Professor Shenoy's criticisms of the Indian government's econ-
omic policies are valuable and merit serious attention. Indeed, it is 
very distressing for me to see, upon visiting my homeland, that the 
economic lot of the man on the street is less satisfactory than what 
I expect upon reading the growth statistics of the country as a whole. 
It is equally disturbing to learn that "black market" is a household 
word, that that market, particularly in food grains, is more open 
than clandestine, and that bribery and other forms of corruption 
are the mode of life at most levels of intercourse with governmental 
officials. 
Despite his valid criticisms, however, Professor Shenoy has failed 
in his own turn to develop fully the arguments supporting his solu-
tions to the Indian economic problem. As a result, one finds him 
taking even contradictory positions. For example, he calls for the 
foreign-aid-giving countries to induce shifts in Indian economic 
policy through economic diplomacy (p. xiv); and at the same time 
he deplores such interference (p. xv). His remedy for the food crisis 
calls for imports of food grains, in addition to stopping inflation 
(p. 30); but, at the same time, he finds P.L. 83-480 imports to be 
a cause of inflation (p. 19) and other ills (p. 78). He pleads for 
drastic cuts in revenue collections by the state in order to step up 
national savings (p. 177); while at the same time he acknowledges 
that the masses of the people are at the margin of subsistence (p. 177) 
and therefore, deductively, not a potential source of savings. More-
over, the person at the margin of subsistence would probably either 
be exempt from taxation or pay at a low rate under a progressive 
income tax. Professor Shenoy makes a strong plea for the abolition 
of progressive taxation (pp. 173-75), but he does not establish that 
the equities which form the argument for the concept of progressive 
taxation are not worth pursuing. He criticizes legislation regulating 
the activities of bankers and moneylenders as a hindrance to the 
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flow of capital to the farmers (p. 32), but he neither specifies the 
laws involved nor establishes his point beyond simply stating it. 
Indeed, this reviewer finds a great deal of merit in regulating, for 
example, usury and other traditional forms of exploitation of the 
farmer in India. Professor Shenoy criticizes antihoarding ordinances 
with respect to food grains, because such ordinances merely shift 
the hoarding from a comparatively small number of traders and 
larger farmers to householders. The reviewer, however, finds merit 
in this shift, since there is a significant distinction between a house-
holder accumulating grains to feed his family in harder times to 
come and a trader arresting the flow of the grains to the householder 
with a view to profiteering when the harder times do come upon 
the householder. 
Finally, although it is not quite clear from the book, it seems 
that Professor Shenoy would like to have the state abstain from 
engaging in the production of goods and services and leave the 
economic life of the country as much to laissez-! a ire as is possible. 
However, in order to make a case for abolishing or minimizing the 
diversion of resources to the public sector of the Indian economy, it 
is necessary to answer at least two basic questions. First, if the 
government does not engage in those activities which private entre-
preneurs are not willing to undertake, how will that task, vital to 
the implementation of the public interest, be accomplished? Second, 
how, if not through the public sector, is it possible in India to 
muster sufficient investment resources for the country's needed 
economic development? In this regard, Professor Shenoy does little 
more than mention capital markets and the market mechanism. Per-
haps he does not recommend a complete abolition of the allocation 
of resources to the public sector in India, but only the restriction of 
that allocation within certain limits. In that case, it would have been 
extremely useful if he had presented his thoughts in detail and 
suggested principles or guidelines for determining the proper econ-
omic limits for the public sector. 
In the last analysis, then, Professor Shenoy's book is more note-
worthy for his valuable criticisms of the economic policies of the 
Indian government than it is for the remedies he suggests. Yet it 
certainly must be read by those interested in Indian economics. 
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